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Background: Little research exists on the effectiveness of workplace visits by labour inspectors in relation
to psychosocial risks. The study aimed to produce a consistent and transferable evidence-based frame-
work.
Methods: We conducted a systematic literature review using the realist synthesis approach. Searches in
three electronic databases, systematic hand-searches in five specialised journals and iterative purposive
searches yielded 25 publications. The initial search included any study between 2000 and 2015 contain-
ing information on labour inspectorates and psychosocial risks or stress at work. We conducted a com-
plementary search to identify publications from French-speaking authors.
Results: The synthesis yielded a conceptual model relating public intervention measures, mechanisms of
action, outcomes and contexts. Publications indicate positive outcomes in 4 cases, possibly positive in 2,
mixed outcomes in 4, and no or poor effects in 10. Studies from Nordic countries show some positive out-
comes of inspection activities based on dialogue with employers, group interviews with employees,
repeated visits and combinations with other communication and information channels, in the context
of highly organised labour markets. Conversely, other studies highlight the limitations of intervention
strategies that rely on an ‘‘enlightenment” principle, in a context of increasingly precarious and flexible
work situations.
Conclusion: The synthesis suggests the possibility of positive outcomes of inspectors’ interventions on
psychosocial risks in supportive contexts and with appropriate training and resources. However, strong
evidence is lacking and more evaluation studies are necessary. A comprehensive conceptual framework
may help to analyse the wide range of factors influencing the effectiveness of workplace visits by
inspectors.
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In the last decades, most industrialised countries have endorsed
regulations requiring systematic occupational health and safety
management. General duty provisions stipulate that employers
have to assess and prevent all occupational health risks. The inte-
gration of organisational and psychosocial health risks into the
scope of occupational health and safety (OHS) has challenged the
roles and daily practices of labour inspectors, who were tradition-
ally more comfortable with technical issues. The present paper
concentrates on the inclusion of psychosocial risks and the assess-
ment of the psychosocial work environment in the strategies and
actions of labour inspectorates. It aims at providing a systematic
review of the publications dealing with this topic.
According to Leka and Cox (2008), ‘‘work-related psychosocial
risks concern aspects of the design and management of work and
its social and organisational contexts that have the potential for
causing psychological or physical harm”. This multifaceted notion
combines health outcomes (fatigue, mental disorders, mental attri-
tion, burnout, cardiovascular diseases, and other forms of suffer-
ing), pathogenic processes (stress reactions), and risk factors
related to the work organisation and interpersonal relationships
(e.g. overload, threats, violence, harassment, restricted autonomy,
lack of recognition, etc.).
For the last 15 years, there has been an increasing number of pub-
lications on national and international psychosocial risk policies.
They often present descriptive accounts, perspectives on the chal-
lenges for regulators and suggestions for the future. Most of them
address the situation in Europe, considered the ‘‘cradle of Occupa-
tional Health” (Gagliardi et al., 2012). For example, Leka et al.
(2015a) conducted a review of 94 hard and soft law policies on psy-
chosocial risks and mental health in Europe. Ertel et al. (2010) exam-
ined the role of European social dialogue in the field of psychosocial
risks; they identified diverging perspectives and structural weak-
nesses. In France, de Gaulejac (2010) undertook a review of three
governmental reports; he criticised the refusal to tackle structural
causes, such as work organisation, management ideology and the
‘‘liberalist dogma” (p. 65). Several authors (Langenhan et al., 2013;
Leka et al., 2011b; Zoni and Lucchini, 2012) found a gap between
policy and practice. Workplaces do not sufficiently understand and
incorporate psychosocial risks into strategic decision-making, and
do not know how to manage them adequately. The European Frame-
work for Psychosocial Risk Management (PRIMA-EF) was developed
to tackle these challenges (Leka et al., 2011a). It provides a model
and indicators for themanagement of psychosocial issues by govern-
ments and companies. Finally, some studies emphasize that devel-
oping countries are not free from psychosocial risks (Cheng, 2015;
Kortum and Leka, 2014; Kortum et al., 2010).
A few other studies focus on an operational level, exploring how
labour inspectors consider psychosocial risks in their daily prac-
tices. A systematic review of this type of publication could be usefulfor government agencies confronted with the difficulty of tackling
these issues. Previous systematic reviews have measured the impact
of labour inspections in terms of injuries and occupational diseases
(MacEachen et al., 2016; Mischke et al., 2013), but to our knowledge,
there has not been any systematic review on labour inspector inter-
vention for the prevention of psychosocial risks. Many countries
have launched intervention programmes over the past 20 years.
However, an overview of their contents, results, success factors,
and limitations is lacking. The development of an evidence-based
programme theory could help labour inspectorates identify what
kinds of interventions could be fruitful, in which contexts, and by
whichmechanisms. For this purpose, we sought to answer two ques-
tions. First, which inspection practices have been developed in
industrialised countries? Secondly, what have been their impact, in
which contexts and by which mechanisms? We studied these ques-
tions through a realist synthesis approach.
2. Methods
2.1. A realist synthesis approach
The aim of a systematic literature review is to synthesise the
available, high quality evidence on the effects of an intervention.
This is interesting for policy-makers, because it delivers an over-
view of the outcomes of policy instruments, based on a transparent
and rigorous process (Victor, 2008a,b). For instance, Robson et al.
(2007) studied the effectiveness of OHS management systems,
and Tompa et al. (2007) the prevention incentives of insurance
and regulatory mechanisms. To date, more than 130 systematic
reviews on health and safety topics are available in the Cochrane
Library (osh.cochrane.org). Specifically, Mischke et al. (2013) con-
ducted a systematic review on enforcement tools for preventing
occupational diseases and injuries. They found evidence that
inspections decrease injuries in the long term but not in the short
term. The magnitude of the effect and the impact of fines and
penalties are uncertain. Larger effects are attained by specific
rather than general inspections.
The Cochrane criteria are usually considered the gold standard
for reviews in safety research, with randomised controlled trials
(RCTs) and quasi-experimental alternatives being the preferred
methods (Pedersen et al., 2012; Verbeek and Ruotsalainen, 2012).
According to Berthelette et al. (2008), systematic reviews often
exclude other types of designs, deemed as methodologically weak,
when results from RCTs are available; however, these authors rec-
ommend complementing this approach by evaluative research and
qualitative methods, to identify the reasons why an intervention
does – or not – lead to the expected outcomes.
Our initial exploratory work revealed that very few studies col-
lected quantitative data on our review topic. Most publications
describe state intervention measures, their contexts and some-
times their outcomes or mechanisms of action. It also turned out
Outcomes: employers
preventive actions
towards PSRs
Willingness to take 
measures 
Formal measures 
Changes in the working 
environment 
Measures: state
interventions towards
PSRs
Reactive visits following a 
complaint 
Planned proactive visits 
Other interventions 
Generative mechanisms
Awareness-raising 
(counselling)  
Fear of sanctions 
(deterrence) 
Requiring precise and 
practical measures vs
formal and general ones 
Work place characteristics (Context)
National and international policies, standards and regulation (Context)
Socioeconomic context
Economic situation 
Labour market situation 
Etc. 
Economic situation 
Company demographics 
Health & safety management, etc. 
Size 
Worker participation 
Economic branch 
Attitudes of social partners 
Available support for employers 
Etc. 
Specific provisions vs general duties 
Inspectors’ competences and attitudes 
Inspectorates’ resources, priorities, organisation 
Fig. 1. Initial rough programme theory.
112 R. Weissbrodt, D. Giauque / Safety Science 100 (2017) 110–124that a sound understanding of the socio-political context of a given
country is necessary to evaluate the outcomes of policy interven-
tions toward psychosocial risks (Cheng, 2015). For these reasons,
a realist synthesis seemed an appropriate method. Realist synthe-
sis (or realist review) is well suited for the review of complex inter-
ventions (Pawson, 2002; Rycroft-Malone et al., 2012). It tries to
answer the question ‘‘What works for whom under what circum-
stances, how and why” (Wong et al., 2013a); it unveils interactions
between contexts, mechanisms and outcomes (CMO configura-
tions). Beyond assessing effectiveness, realist synthesis aims at
developing theories. Wong et al. (2013b) recommend constructing
a rough initial programme theory before beginning the review. It
should sketch what is supposed to happen and why it is supposed
to work. In the course of the review, evidence is gathered to assess
its relevance and contribute to its evolution. The output is an
enriched programme theory describing the ways different contexts
trigger different mechanisms and generate different outcomes. The
search for and appraisal of evidence are guided by primary
research’s contribution to this development process; multiple
types of evidence may be included (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2012).
Recent literature offers various examples of realist syntheses
approaches to public health topics (Wong et al., 2011), manage-
ment of sickness absence (Higgins et al., 2012) or health and safety
committees (Yassi et al., 2013).2.2. Development of a rough initial programme theory
In order to sketch a theoretical model, we began with an
exploratory literature search with Google Scholar and in Thomson
Reuters’ Web of Science. We contacted researchers abroad and
talked with Swiss government representatives. A special issue of
Safety Science (Lippel and Quinlan, 2011) also delivered a first over-
view of the field. A model by Baril-Gingras et al. (2006) inspiredfurther developments; it aims to explain the processes leading to
preventive changes inside workplaces during OHS interventions
conducted by external advisors.
Fig. 1 depicts our initial rough theory of labour inspectors’ inter-
ventions on psychosocial risks. It starts with the regulatory measures
implemented by authorities, mainly reactive and proactive work-
place inspections (Walters et al., 2011). These measures aim at rais-
ing employers’ willingness to prevent psychosocial risk, and lead
them to implement preventive actions (outcomes). These may be
either formal (e.g. workplace policies) or practical. Several mecha-
nisms may result in such shifts of attitudes. Counselling may raise
awareness; controlling may have a deterring effect; and requiring
specific types of measures (e.g. formal and general vs specific and
practical) may influence an employer’s reasoning and reactions. Pos-
itive effects occur if a supportive context triggers the generative
mechanisms; Lippel and Quinlan (2011) list a series of factors per-
taining to the regulatory background. The socioeconomic context
certainly has an influence, too. Finally, workplace characteristics
(size, branch, etc.) may influence the management of psychosocial
risks (Jain, 2011) and an employer’s reactions to an inspection.
We presented this initial theory to stakeholders within the Fed-
eral Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), the Swiss government
agency that supervises the activities of the cantonal labour inspec-
torates. We also informally discussed it with labour inspectors and
other specialists active in the field. The model served as a backbone
for the whole review process (search strategy, search terms, inclu-
sion and exclusion criteria, data extraction form, data coding, anal-
ysis and synthesis).2.3. Search process
The main search took place in the Web of Science Core Collec-
tion (English, French, German, Italian, Spanish), MEDLINE (all lan-
Initial search
Labour inspections’ activities toward psychosocial risks 
Web of Science Core Collection: 160 citations 
Medline: 393 citations 
Psycinfo: 352 citations 
(11/9-29/9/2015) 
29 citations after 
first screen 
(title/abstract) 
Additional citations: 
Backward and forward citation 
tracking: 14 
Tables of contents/indexes  
Policy and Practice in Health 
and Safety (PPHS, all issues): 4 
Safety and health at work 
(SH@W, all issues): 3 
Work & Stress (2000-2015): 0 
Safety Science (2000-2015): 0 
Scandinavian journal of work, 
environment and health (2000-
2015): 0 
Others: 13 
63 citations after 
first screen 
(title/abstract) 
23 citations 
contributing to 
synthesis after 2nd
full-text screen (*) 
Iterative search
Complementary search in French-speaking literature 
(*) From WOS Core Collection: 7 
 From Medline: 0 
 From Psycinfo: 1 
 From the citation tracking: 3 
Consultation of the lists of publications of, 
and direct contact with, 7 French-speaking researchers 
(Nov.-Dec. 2015) 
12 citations after 
first screen 
(title/abstract) 
Additional citations: 
Tables of contents/indexes  
Pistes: 0 
@ctivités: 0 
Le Travail Humain: 0 
2 citations 
contributing to 
synthesis after 2nd
full-text screen 
In sum, 25 citations contributing to synthesis after 2nd full-text 
screen 
 From PPHS: 3 
 From SH@W: 1 
 From other sources: 8 
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
Fig. 2. Flow diagram of the search process.
Table 1
Inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Inclusion criteria
The publication addresses interventions of labour inspectorates in connection with psychosocial risks or stress at work
More general papers on psychosocial risk policies are included only if labour inspection is explicitly addressed
Exclusion criteria
Publications dealing mainly or strictly with:
 Impacts of occupational risks on health
 Causes of and risk factors for psychosocial risks
 A specific psychosocial risk (e.g. aggression, bullying, harassment, burnout, ethnic or gender discrimination, etc.)
 Epidemiology of psychosocial risks
 Preventive interventions inside workplaces, unrelated to public authorities
 Therapeutic treatments for occupational health problems
 Psychometric measures of psychosocial risks
 Court cases or interpretations of legal provisions, unrelated to broader public policies or inspector intervention
 Description of a national regime for occupational risk prevention
 Countries other than developed countries with market economy
R. Weissbrodt, D. Giauque / Safety Science 100 (2017) 110–124 113guages), and Psycinfo (all languages), for the years 2000–2015. We
developed a list of search terms for each database (see Additional
file 1, available for download on the journal’s website). MeSH
terms were used in MEDLINE when available. We complemented
the search process by citation-tracking and consultation of tables
of contents or indexes of specialised journals (see Fig. 2 in Sec-
tion 3.1 for details). We also included papers retrieved from the ini-
tial exploratory search.
An additional search aimed at identifying publications by
French-speaking authors, some of which are critical regarding the
concept of psychosocial risks (Bouffartigue, 2012; Davezies,
2001; Lhuilier, 2010; Loriol, 2010). They consider that it too often
leads to individual-oriented preventive measures rather than col-
lective debates inside the workplaces. Protecting health at work
should be primarily about creating conditions in which individuals
and groups can develop the quality of their work and their compe-
tencies. Authors referring to such a developmental approach mighthave a specific way of considering labour inspection of psychoso-
cial risks. As only very few publications by French-speaking
researchers were found in the databases in the first step, we
searched for references in the lists of publications of seven authors
from Belgium, France and Québec. We also directly asked them for
relevant publications. Finally, we read the tables of contents of sev-
eral French-written scientific journals (see Fig. 2).2.4. Selection and appraisal of documents
Table 1 lists the inclusion and exclusion criteria; they were cho-
sen by the two authors, in cooperation with other researchers
within the SECO.
Realist reviews do not necessarily rely on quality evaluation
checklists. The selection and appraisal process deals above all with
a publication’s contribution to the development of the programme
theory (Gillespie and Marshall, 2015). Wong et al. (2013a) recom-
Table 2
Impact ladder (Hansen et al., 2015).
Impact of working environment inspections
Step 7 Improved health, including reduction of absenteeism due to sickness
Step 6 Reduction in the rate of industrial accidents and work-related diseases
Step 5 Reduction in exposures, including risks of accidents
Step 4 Improved (safer) production technology and safer work processes
Step 3 Improvements in the enterprises’ working environment efforts
Step 2 Changes in attitudes at the workplaces
Step 1 Changes in knowledge at the workplaces
114 R. Weissbrodt, D. Giauque / Safety Science 100 (2017) 110–124mend evaluating the rigor of any section of data within a docu-
ment, i.e. whether the methods used to generate the data are cred-
ible and trustworthy. However, they specify that useful data exist
even in methodologically weak studies and other sources. We used
three categories for a simple appraisal of rigor: high for peer-
reviewed publications relying on empirical data, medium for peer-
reviewed documents not based on empirical data (or conversely),
and low for non-peer-reviewed documents not based on empirical
data. This notion of rigor applies only to the way a publication dealt
with psychosocial inspection; it is not a judgement on the rigor of
the whole publication. This is important to point out, as several pub-
lications address this issue only as a secondary topic.
Due to limited resources, only the first author conducted the
search, selection and appraisal of publications. However, the
authors planned every step together and regularly discussed the
review process.
2.5. Data extraction
We devised a data extraction form consisting of two main parts.
The first dealt with a publication’s general characteristics: authors,
year, type, objectives, studied countries, focus and methods. The
second part served to extract information in realistic terms: inter-
vention measures, contexts, mechanisms and outcomes. As no
publication adopted a realist perspective, data extraction involved
interpretation, in order to assign the elements of information to
one or the other section of the form. It is indeed often difficult to
distinguish between contexts and mechanisms (Dalkin et al.,
2015) or between mechanisms and interventions (Marchal et al.,
2012). To address these challenges, we adopted the definition pro-
posed by Wong et al. (2013b): mechanisms are invisible, causal
processes that explain how the infrastructure and the resources
of a programme lead to specific decisions or behaviours among
stakeholders in specific contexts. It may be factors such as reason-
ing, preferences, norms or collective beliefs. To infer them from the
data, these authors recommend mentally reconstructing a stake-
holder’s reasoning.
The first author carried out the data extraction for every publi-
cation. He summarised all forms in two tables corresponding to the
two parts of the form. The second author checked their content for
consistency, however without systematically rereading the arti-
cles. This check did not lead to significant changes of the coding.
Both tables can be downloaded as Supplementary Material (Addi-
tional files 2 and 3).
2.6. Analysis and synthesis processes
We extracted at least one context-mechanism-outcome config-
uration out of every publication. Configurations were deemed
complete when they provided at least some information on con-
texts, mechanisms and outcomes, and partial when one or more
category was missing. The next step was to hand code the material
through a classical iterative process, with themes gradually emerg-
ing from the dataset (Creswell, 2014). Whenever mentioned, inter-vention outcomes were qualified as poor, mixed, possibly positive
or positive. We further coded them depending on their type, using
an impact ladder described in Table 2 (Hansen et al., 2015). This
process allowed for a ‘‘quantitizing” (Tashakkori and Teddlie,
1998) of mostly qualitative data, in order to compute frequencies
and cross-tabulations. To compensate for the drawbacks of having
only one researcher coding the data, we systematically kept track
of the process (see Additional file 4 for the coding scheme, and
Additional files 2 and 3 for the coded data).
Finally, we synthesised the results by filling in the boxes of the
initial rough theoretical model with the themes that emerged from
the analysis. We identified two particularly illustrative and syn-
thetic CMO configurations – one negative and one positive – and
used them to exemplify how contexts shape the intervention
methods of labour inspectors, as well as their impact.
3. Results
3.1. Document characteristics
Fig. 2 depicts the searching process. One fourth of the papers
(6/25) were published between 2004 and 2009, and 19 after
2010. About two thirds (17/25) came from peer-reviewed journals.
Only 3 were primary research papers using quantitative data
(Rasmussen et al., 2011; SLIC, 2012; Stadler and Splittgerber,
2014). Every other study employed qualitative methods (17) or
narrative reviews (5). However, some of them reported on quanti-
tative results from grey literature (Hansen et al., 2015; Johnstone
et al., 2011; Velásquez, 2012). Half of the papers (13) fulfilled our
criteria for high rigor, 8 for medium and 4 for low rigor. Overall,
we extracted 30 CMO configurations; 21 were complete and 9 par-
tial, of which 7 did not include information on outcomes and 2 on
mechanisms.
Almost half of the publications (11) originated in Nordic coun-
tries, and 8 in other European countries. Some papers came from
Australia (3) and Canada (1), and 2 covered several countries or
continents. The majority (16) focussed on our specific review topic
– inspection of the psychosocial work environment. The others
indirectly addressed this issue through standards, policies and reg-
ulations on psychosocial risks (5), inspection of occupational
health and safety (3), and participation and social dialogue (1).
Papers aimed at describing, evaluating or developing methods
and instruments for psychosocial risk inspections (15), analysing
inspection practices and processes (9), barriers and resources for
regulatory interventions (8), legal provisions (5), stakeholders’ atti-
tudes (5), and impacts of macro-level political, organisational or
socioeconomic changes on inspection activity (3).
Only 5 papers specifically aimed at evaluating outcomes of
interventions. Frick (2014) conducted a review of 270 case studies
of labour inspectorates’ interventions in Sweden. Hansen et al.
(2015) reported on the results of two inquiries: one was a tele-
phone survey of companies visited by the Danish Work Environ-
ment Authority; the other was a comparison of two groups of
randomly selected enterprises in Norway, one of which had
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comes through document analysis, interviews with regulatory
managers and inspectors, and observations at workplace visits.
The report by the Committee of Senior Labour Inspectors on its
European inspection campaign on psychosocial risks (SLIC, 2012)
was based on 23 country reports with quantitative and qualitative
questions. Finally, Starheim (2014) measured outcomes through
case studies of workplaces visited by Danish inspectors. She relied
on semi-structured group and individual interviews with work-
place representatives and workshops at some workplaces.
3.2. Main findings
The presentation of the results follows the structure of the ini-
tial rough programme theory. We proceed from macro to micro
levels, beginning with the contextual dimensions, continuing with
the intervention measures and their underlying mechanisms and
finishing with the outcomes. Fig. 3 visually synthesises the data,
showing all the categories and subcategories derived from the cod-
ing process.
3.2.1. Contexts
We extracted 216 elements of information on the contexts. We
coded them in 3 overarching classes and 15 categories. The amount
of data regarding contexts was much larger than for the other
dimensions of the initial rough programme theory. To account
for this variety, we further defined 36 subcategories. The largest
class of information concerned policies, standards and regulation
(148 elements of information), followed by the socioeconomic con-
text (38 elements) and finally by workplace characteristics (30
elements).
3.2.1.1. Policies, standards and regulation. The most frequent cate-
gory was legislation. Several publications in Noridc countries
reported on the existence of provisions on the psychosocial work
environment and on bullying (Hansen et al., 2015; Saksvik et al.,
2007). Others reported on legislation pertaining to specific risk fac-
tors in several EU countries (SLIC, 2012). However, according to
nearly one third of the publications, there is a lack of specific or
clear legal provisions. On the other hand, several authors noted
that general legal duties encompass the psychosocial risks (Bruhn
and Frick, 2011; Frick, 2014; Hansen et al., 2015; Johnstone et al.,
2011; Toukas et al., 2015). For this reason, Lerouge (2014) and
Velásquez (2012) consider that there is no normative void for psy-
chosocial risks in Europe. According to Velásquez, the existence of
a specific legislation does not have a determining influence on
workplace practices. Nevertheless, Lippel and Quinlan (2011)
argue that the lack of specific provisions increases the threat of lit-
igation by employers against inspectors’ requirements. In the
Canadian state of Québec, Lippel et al. (2011) noted that several
important OHS provisions apply only to minority sectors, exclud-
ing industries with high psychosocial burdens. Finally, Lippel and
Quinlan (2011) and Lippel et al. (2011) described rising compensa-
tion costs as an incentive to regulate on psychosocial risks; how-
ever, they drew attention to the relative invisibility of these risks
to compensation insurers.
The next most frequent category concerned the scope of inter-
ventions by authorities. Several authors described how the com-
plexity of working life challenges labour inspectors and leads to
an expansion of the work environment concept (Bruhn, 2006,
2009; Bruhn and Frick, 2011; Starheim and Bøgehus, 2014). There
is a typical evolution in many countries, from an initial focus on
harassment and violence toward a broader understanding of psy-
chosocial risks (Lippel and Quinlan, 2011). Walters et al. (2011),
Bruhn and Frick (2011) and Frick (2014) reported on the regulatory
shift toward ‘‘regulated self-regulation” (or ‘‘process regulation”),that is the duty to have some form of internal regulation within
companies. Hansen et al. (2015) explained that Nordic countries
have developed a risk factor approach to psychosocial inspections.
They have practices on factors such as violence, bullying and sex-
ual harassment, while work hours and some other risk factors
are not part of inspection duties in several countries. For example,
in Denmark, inspectors may not intervene on psychosocial prob-
lems resulting from decisions by management that can be solved
in collaboration with employees, such as compensation issues, lack
of meaningful work, and job insecurity (Rasmussen et al., 2011).
The broadening scope of intervention raises interpretation issues;
the notion of psychosocial risks lacks clarity (Leka et al., 2015b),
and there is a slightly different understanding even between the
Nordic countries (Hansen et al., 2015). According to Bruhn and
Frick (2011), WEA managers in Sweden underestimated the com-
plexity of these issues and this contributed to the difficulty of
developing new inspection methods.
Nearly half of the publications addressed inspection strategies
on psychosocial risks. Some authors described varying inspection
methods, purposes and initiatives across countries. Nordic coun-
tries have a broad understanding of the psychosocial work envi-
ronment, and Southern European countries a more restrictive
occupational hazards approach (Lerouge, 2014). The psychosocial
work environment is a priority area in Northern Europe; Denmark
and Finland have quantitative goals for stress reduction (Hansen
et al., 2015). Some Nordic inspectorates conduct specific psychoso-
cial assessments, while others focus on the systematic work envi-
ronment efforts by the enterprises. In any case, only Danish
inspectors routinely carry out psychosocial risk assessments in
most workplaces. Inspectorates internationally are becoming more
active in this area (Lippel and Quinlan, 2011). However, Walters
et al. (2011) contended that, overall, agencies do not have clear
inspection strategies to achieve improved management of OSH,
nor adequate resources to deal with the consequences of the
changing world of work and the change of balance between capital
and labour. According to Quinlan (2007), Australian authorities
have neglected the issue of downsizing/restructuring, seen as a
managerial prerogative. Finally, two publications addressed strate-
gic dilemmas faced by inspectorates: Bruhn (2006) reported on the
difficult choice between their controlling and counselling roles,
and Starheim and Bøgehus (2014) on the contradictions between
the WEA’s strategy of reducing the duration of inspections and
the inspectors’ views about the necessary success conditions.
Several publications showed very contrasting practices across
countries, depending on whether the authorities focus on sub-
stance, process, individual cases, work organisation and design, lit-
igation, compensation or prevention (Lerouge, 2014; Lippel and
Quinlan, 2011). Mellor et al. (2011) specifically studied the imple-
mentation of the British Management Standards, which are the
main public policy approach developed in the UK for preventing
stress at work. They highlighted the potential and the barriers for
an effective implementation of the Standards, as assessed by
labour inspectors. Other publications reported on tools and meth-
ods developed to address psychosocial issues. Hansen et al. (2015)
described methods used in Nordic countries, mainly meetings with
management, interviews with employees, inspection guidelines,
and surveys completed by employees during inspection visits. In
Australia, Johnstone et al. (2011) indicated that codes of practice
and guidance material have been developed for limited groups of
risk factors. According to the SLIC (2012), inspection methods need
to be adapted to each national context.
Some authors reported on shortcomings of public policy inter-
ventions. Improvement notices on psychosocial issues remain rare,
even in Nordic countries (Hansen et al., 2015). In Australia, psy-
chosocial risks are a marginal issue in visits, despite the significant
level of concern among inspectors. Moreover, the exploration of
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reliance on verbal evidence, time-consuming investigations,
mostly formal preventive measures advocated by agencies and a
limited impact (Johnstone et al., 2011; Quinlan, 2007). Walters
et al. (2011) asserted that there has not been any sustained changein inspection practice after the introduction of ‘‘process regula-
tion”. There is an increased focus on procedural issues rather than
a fundamental change.
Inspectors’ competences on psychosocial issues were also fre-
quently addressed. Inspectors have long been recruited for their
R. Weissbrodt, D. Giauque / Safety Science 100 (2017) 110–124 117technical qualifications. They are therefore often unfamiliar with
psychological risk factors (Lerouge, 2012; Stadler and
Splittgerber, 2014; Toukas et al., 2015). In Europe, some countries
had never inspected psychosocial risks before the SLIC campaign
(SLIC, 2012). Accordingly, training, mentoring and guidance are
necessary (Bruhn, 2006; Hansen et al., 2015; Johnstone et al.,
2011; SLIC, 2012; Stadler and Splittgerber, 2014). Lippel and
Quinlan (2011) described a gradual learning process. Several
authors also reported on changes in the recruitment of inspectors.
Inspectorates begin to hire inspectors with an academic back-
ground and competences in behavioural and group issues (Bruhn
and Frick, 2011; Johnstone et al., 2011; Lippel et al., 2011). Accord-
ing to Bruhn (2009), the strategy for professionalization of inspec-
tors in Sweden remains weak. Changes in recruitment led to a
cultural gap between traditional and mostly male inspectors with
a technical background and newly hired, mostly female, human
sciences specialists.
Some publications provided additional information on the
resources, support and statutes of labour inspectorates. Publica-
tions from Denmark and Sweden reported on the political support
and an increase of resources for inspectorates, at least for some
time (Bruhn, 2009; Bruhn and Frick, 2011; Rasmussen et al.,
2011). On the other hand, publications from several countries
either reported on insufficient resources for inspectorates to per-
form their tasks in a context of growing complexity, or even on a
decrease of their resources and a weakening of their influence
(Frick, 2014; Leka et al., 2015b; Lerouge, 2012; Lippel and
Quinlan, 2011; Walters et al., 2011).
Finally, a few publications reported on employers’ opposition to
government initiatives and legislative provisions on psychosocial
risks and to interventions addressing structural and organisational
factors (Frick, 2014; Johnstone et al., 2011; Leka et al., 2015b;
Lippel and Quinlan, 2011; Quinlan, 2007).3.2.1.2. Socioeconomic context. The social partnership was
addressed in almost half of the publications. According to the
SLIC (2012), employees or representatives are involved in the risk
assessment in most companies and countries. On the other hand,
Stadler and Splittgerber (2014) reported on a lack of information
gathered from employees during the SLIC campaign in Germany,
because of the rarity of workers’ representatives in industries with
a high percentage of small companies. Walters et al. (2011) stated
that the introduction of ‘‘process regulation” in most countries was
not accompanied by overt strategies to increase worker
participation.
Nordic authors, in a context of highly organised labour markets,
described the role of agreements between social partners in the
regulation of the work environment. Hasle and Petersen (2004)
mentioned an increasing difficulty in distinguishing between regu-
lation and agreements in Denmark. They raised questions about
the balance between these two different conceptions of state inter-
vention: agreements are characterised by a weak system of imple-
mentation and may limit the scope of intervention of inspectors,
e.g. on working hours (Hansen et al., 2015; Rasmussen et al.,
2011). The three publications from Australia (Johnstone et al.,
2011; Quinlan, 2007; Quinlan et al., 2009) showed a different con-
text, marked by a decrease in union density and a retreat of indus-
trial relations regulation. Finally, Hasle and Petersen (2004)
highlighted the increasing proximity between the two fields of
OHS regulation and industrial relations. Psychosocial factors are
related to industrial relations issues such as flexible work, working
hours, outsourcing, temporary employment and intensity of work.
Moreover, the trend toward deregulation makes it difficult to argue
for stricter legislation; collective agreements might be an alterna-
tive approach.Several publications reported on changes in the labour market
leading to an erosion of economic and social drivers of OHS regu-
lation. Precarious employment and flexible work arrangements
are increasing (small firms, self-employed, temporary workers,
downsizing, mergers and acquisitions, unsuccessful change pro-
cesses, etc.). These changes weaken OHS regimes, increase psy-
chosocial risks, and make it difficult for inspectors to reach
workplaces. Economic crisis and austerity measures contribute to
this trend. The neoliberal climate promotes a light-touch,
business-friendly approach, but also undermines collective negoti-
ation and industrial relations regulation (Frick, 2014; Leka et al.,
2015b; Quinlan, 2007; Saksvik et al., 2007; Stadler and
Splittgerber, 2014; Toukas et al., 2015; Walters et al., 2011).
3.2.1.3. Workplace characteristics. Overall, there is little information
on workplace practices for managing the psychosocial work envi-
ronment. According to the SLIC report (2012), more than half of
the workplaces have made a psychosocial risk assessment (with
large variations across countries). Workload, stress, threats and
violence were frequently identified, and action was needed in
two thirds of the workplaces (again with large variations); experts
were involved in the risk assessment in most companies. Stadler
and Splittgerber (2014) reported that an appropriate risk assess-
ment had been conducted in half of the workplaces visited during
the SLIC campaign in Germany; management of stress factors
seemed to have been integrated in 15–25% of workplaces, and
measures against psychosocial risks implemented in 20% of the
companies. Frick (2014) observed a tendency for companies to
individualise work environment issues, and Toukas et al. (2015)
contended that many employers do not consider psychosocial
risks. A third of the publications identified barriers to psychosocial
risk management within workplaces. The most common are the
small size of workplaces (Bruhn and Frick, 2011; Hasle and
Petersen, 2004; Leka et al., 2015b; SLIC, 2012) and their lack of
knowledge (Jespersen et al., 2014; Mellor et al., 2011; SLIC,
2012). Other barriers are a lack of involvement of trade unions
and workers representatives, a negative or passive attitude of com-
panies and the necessity of a considerable and never-ending
investment from employers for systematic OHS management
(Hasle and Petersen, 2004; Mellor et al., 2011; Walters et al.,
2011). Mellor et al. (2011) mentioned yet other barriers, such as
organisational change, a target-driven culture, weak support from
senior management and a lack of management availability and
competency.
A few publications pointed at enablers within workplaces:
senior management support, involvement of decision-makers,
employee participation, regular and multi-pronged communica-
tions, organisational culture and capability, pre-existing thoughts
and solutions waiting for an opportunity for implementation
(Mellor et al., 2011; Starheim, 2014). According to the European
Survey on New and Emerging Risks (ESENER), the fulfilment of
legal duties is the strongest incentive for the prevention of psy-
chosocial risks. Clients’ complaints and concern about image are
also important. The wish to decrease absenteeism and improve
performance does not seem to be an incentive, and pressure by
labour inspections only plays a marginal role (Velásquez, 2012).
The review delivered almost no data on workplace structural
characteristics that may influence the prevention of psychosocial
risks. Some publications described which industries were selected
for the SLIC campaign – mainly health and social care, hotels and
restaurants, transport and retail (Lerouge, 2012; SLIC, 2012;
Stadler and Splittgerber, 2014), without suggesting causal relation-
ships with outcomes. Mellor et al. (2011) indicated that the British
Management Standards were first piloted in industries with high
levels of stress-related absence – government, health services, edu-
cation and finance.
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We defined five groups of publications depending on the kind of
government intervention they addressed: workplace visits (9 pub-
lications), public policies (9), development of tools and instru-
ments (4), overall inspection activities including a range of
unspecified measures (3), and alternative strategies such as supply
chain initiatives and other systemic strategies (1). Nine categories
of generative mechanisms underlying these measures emerged out
of the coding process. Most publications contained several
mechanisms.
Dialogue between inspectors and employers, employees, staff
representatives or social partners was most frequently mentioned
(13 publications). For example, Bruhn and Frick (2011) stressed the
central role of negotiations between inspectors and managers to
reach a common perception of psychosocial risks, and Starheim
and Bøgehus (2014) observed strategies employed by inspectors
to disseminate information across the social spaces of the work-
place in order to create a positive dynamic. Enlightenment (12
papers) is a frequent and similar strategy; it aims at educating,
building capacity and promoting voluntary compliance through
advice, guidance, tools and support by consultants.
More than one third of the publications (9) noted a focus on
procedures rather than on content in OHS enforcement, with
inspectors auditing systems and requiring risk assessments, and
authorities that promote a risk management approach. Several
authors are critical of this tendency (Frick, 2014; Jespersen et al.,
2014; Johnstone et al., 2011; Lippel et al., 2011).
Deterrence (8 publications) is a strategy based on the threat of
sanctions, pressure and a ‘‘command and control” inspection style.
Hasle and Petersen (2004) and Walters et al. (2011) suggested that
deterrence might have positive effects; the other publications
rather highlighted its rarity. Some publications (6) indicated that
time plays a role in the inspection of psychosocial risks. Inspectors
use time strategies (Quinlan et al., 2009; Starheim and Bøgehus,
2014); providing companies with time to assimilate concepts and
translate them into practice (Lippel and Quinlan, 2011), conducting
repeated visits (Bruhn, 2006; Hansen et al., 2015; Quinlan et al.,
2009), or focussing on long term improvements (Bruhn, 2009;
Starheim and Bøgehus, 2014). Several authors cited flexibility (6
papers). For example, Bruhn (2006) indicated that inspectors mustTable 3
Outcomes of public intervention measures (sum > 25).
Intervention measures References
Inspection visits (9)
Positive outcomes (2) SLIC (2012)*, Stadler and Splittgerbe
Possibly positive (1) Toukas et al. (2015)
Mixed (2) Starheim (2014)*, Velásquez (2012)
Poor (2) Lerouge (2012), Lippel et al. (2011)*
Not assessed (2) Starheim and Bøgehus (2014), Jespe
Policies: Policy-mix of regulatory and voluntary approaches (6); Policies on regulated self
Possibly positive outcomes (1) Hasle and Petersen (2004)
Mixed (2) Frick (2014)*, Quinlan et al. (2009)*
Poor (6) Bruhn (2006), Hasle and Petersen (2
Not assessed (1) Lippel and Quinlan (2011)
Development of methods, tools, instruments (4): Swedish inspection methods, Danish ins
Management standards
Poor outcomes (1) Mellor et al. (2011)*
Not assessed (3) Bruhn and Frick (2011), Rasmussen
Inspection activities overall (3)
Positive outcomes (1) Hansen et al. (2015)*
Poor (1) Johnstone et al. (2011)*
Not assessed (1) Bruhn (2009)
Alternative methods (1)
Positive outcomes (1) Walters et al. (2011)*
Note: Several measures and outcomes are possible in a single publication. Publication
Number of publications specified between brackets.adapt their inspection style on a case-by-case basis, negotiate risk
assessments, and be flexible about solutions. Johnstone et al.
(2011) referred to the concept of responsive regulation, according
to which inspectors tailor their responses to the ability of an
employer to self-regulate.
Some publications (3) dealt with the question of focussing on
specific psychosocial issues (risk factor approach) or promoting a
holistic understanding (Rasmussen et al., 2011; Toukas et al.,
2015). According to Quinlan (2007), inspectors and employers
may have a tendency to concentrate on particular symptoms,
rather than on their generative context. Legitimising was men-
tioned as yet another mechanism in 3 publications. Starheim
(2014) showed how inspectors’ intervention might legitimise
internal actors or initiatives. Hasle and Petersen (2004) insisted
on the necessity of massive activities to make social partner agree-
ments socially visible and a part of a company’s external legiti-
macy. Finally, Leka et al. (2015b) considered that the traditional
‘‘problem perspective” in OHS, focussing on legal requirements,
economic cases and negative outcomes, has a de-legitimising effect
among employers.3.2.3. Outcomes
Authors provided some kind of outcome evaluation in 18 pub-
lications. Among them, 7 did not provide empirical evidence to
support their appraisal. The other 11 based their evaluation on
data gathered through case studies, surveys, observations during
workplace visits, interviews, document analysis or focus groups.
Table 3 cross-tabulates the types of intervention measures with
the outcome categories, and accordingly lists the references.3.2.3.1. Positive outcomes. Positive results were reported in 4 pub-
lications (but only 1 peer-reviewed article). First, Hansen et al.
(2015) reported that the Danish Working Environment Authority
(WEA) is good at identifying issues in companies and that inspec-
tion has a clear impact. They also showed that, in Norway,
inspected enterprises are more able than others to document their
health and safety activities and to assess psychosocial risk factors;
no significant differences on more specific psychosocial parame-
ters were found. In sum, these outcomes match step 3 on ther (2014)*
rsen et al. (2014)
-regulation, including psychosocial issues (2); Policies on social dialogue (1)
004), Leka et al. (2015b), Lerouge (2014), Quinlan (2007)*, Walters et al. (2011)
pection tool, Norwegian guidelines on healthy organisational change and British
et al. (2011), Saksvik et al. (2007)
s providing an empirical-based outcome evaluation are marked with an asterisk.
R. Weissbrodt, D. Giauque / Safety Science 100 (2017) 110–124 119impact ladder described in Section 2.6 (improvements in the enter-
prises’ work environment efforts).
Secondly, the SLIC (2012) reported on its 2012 European inspec-
tion campaign on psychosocial risks. On the whole, employers
were cooperative and interested in receiving information and
advice. The campaign was somewhat successful at inducing mea-
sures, contributing to OSH management and prevention in the
enterprises, informing employers and workers, raising awareness
of psychosocial risks and increasing adequate risk assessments.
These outcomes correspond to steps 1 (changes in knowledge at
the workplaces), 2 (changes in attitudes at the workplaces) and 3
of the impact ladder.
Thirdly, the implementation of the SLIC campaign in Germany
was the subject of a peer-reviewed article by Stadler and
Splittgerber (2014). They found a high acceptance of the campaign
in most workplaces (step 2). Finally, the report by Walters et al.
(2011) yielded two positive CMO configurations. One concerned
a supply chain initiative by the Swedish WEA in large oil corpora-
tions. It resulted in preventive measures against robberies in the
majority of franchised stations (step 4: improved production tech-
nology and safer work processes). These initiatives relied on a con-
vergence of interests and efforts of social interest groups,
regulators and media attention, creating threats to business, as
well as on negotiation with the companies at the head of the sup-
ply chains. The other configuration involved promotional strategies
in northern countries. They aimed at improving OHS management
systems and at reaching ‘‘hard-to-reach” groups, through enlight-
enment and promotion of local dialogue between employers and
workers. The authors reported on a positive – if not always ideal
– evolution of norms. Inspection and surveillance of OHS manage-
ment by the Swedish WEA is accepted, and enterprises generally
comply with its requirements, including those on psychosocial
risks (steps 2 and 3).
3.2.3.2. Possibly positive outcomes. In two cases, peer-reviewed arti-
cles suggested the possibility of positive results, without specifying
them, nor providing empirical evidence. Hasle and Petersen (2004)
studied agreements between social partners. They suggested that
agreements consisting of efforts based on legal standards (such
as a Danish agreement on monotonous and repetitive work) might
have positive outcomes. Voluntary agreements on human
resources policies could also have positive health and safety out-
comes, but these are restricted to the most committed companies
that are more likely to make use of them. Finally, Toukas et al.
(2015) reported on the SLIC campaign; they distinguished a tradi-
tional inspection model focussing on singular problematic situa-
tions, and a modern, more holistic but also less frequent
approach to inspection. The latter seems more effective.
3.2.3.3. Mixed outcomes. Mixed results were found in 4 papers (2
peer-reviewed). Frick (2014) studied the implementation of sys-
tematic work environment management in Sweden. Employers,
safety representatives and authorities have positive opinions on
inspection visits and on their results, especially for technical risks
and in larger companies (impact step 5: reduction in exposures,
including risks of accidents). However, more generally considered,
implementation of systematic management is too often formal,
and there is not much improvement in organisational and psy-
chosocial issues. In Australia, Quinlan et al. (2009) observed a
growing but reactive and fragmented response from regulators to
changing work arrangements. Inspectors are successful at explain-
ing law and enhancing compliance (step 1), but have difficulties in
securing an enduring level of compliance. In Denmark, Starheim
(2014) conducted case studies on workplace reaction to inspection
visits. Some companies improve in accordance with the inspectors’
requirements (steps 3 and 4). In other companies, improvementmeasures differ from the requirements. The result depends on
the workplace’s internal dynamics, on the agreement with the
problem description made by the inspector, on the acceptance of
suggested solutions and on the workplace’s capacity to understand
the causes of the problems. Lastly, Velásquez (2012) mentioned
that the Nordic way of inspecting psychosocial risks seems more
effective than the approach of other EU countries. However, this
result may entail a confusion between the roles of inspectors and
employers, because risk assessment and prevention are fundamen-
tally employer duties. He also indicated that compliance is lower
on psychosocial issues than on other OHS issues.
3.2.3.4. Poor outcomes. Finally, 10 publications (7 peer-reviewed)
showed an absence of positive outcomes for public policies (6),
inspection visits (2), overall inspection activities (1), and the devel-
opment of inspection tools (1). Bruhn (2006) reported on the intro-
duction of ‘‘regulated self-regulation” as the main strategy in the
Swedish OSH policy, and on the inclusion of psychosocial factors
in the concept of the work environment. Overall, the results
remains rather formal. Hasle and Petersen (2004) mentioned that
some agreements in Denmark tend to exclude inspector interven-
tion on topics such as bullying, harassment and working hours.
These agreements present increased implementation problems,
particularly in passive or negatively disposed workplaces. More-
over, traditional collective agreements on wages, working hours,
etc. rarely include work environment issues, and thus have no
effect in this respect.
In Australia, Johnstone et al. (2011) observed an evolution of
inspectorates’ interventions, from a reactive approach to harass-
ment issues to a broader approach covering more psychosocial
risks. However, inspectors think that outcomes are poor in compar-
ison with the time spent on investigations. Quinlan (2007) found
that Australian regulatory responses to downsizing and restructur-
ing do not have much influence on employers’ practices. Most
employers remain unaware of their legal duties. Risk assessment
and worker consultation are cursory, planning for the effects of
change is poor and employers tend to focus on the symptoms of
stress, violence or bullying, rather than on their organisational
roots.
At EU-level, Leka et al. (2015b) investigated the current policy-
mix including regulatory approaches, agreements and voluntary
systems. Results are disappointing. Few companies inform their
workers on psychosocial risks and take appropriate action. Mea-
sures are often reactive; they focus on the individual, rehabilitation
and return to work. In France, Lerouge (2012, 2014) predicted
weak results for the SLIC inspection campaign; he suggested that
due to a problem of law enforcement, the French approach might
be less efficient than other national systems. In Québec, Lippel
et al. (2011) studied psychosocial inspections based on the imple-
mentation of the general duty clause; according to union represen-
tatives, inspectorates’ emphasis on procedural dimensions
undermines the prevention agenda by individualising issues. In
the UK, Mellor et al. (2011) assessed the implementation of the
Management Standards on stress at work. They indicated that psy-
chosocial scores from national surveys have remained constant
since the introduction of the Standards. Most organisations imple-
ment a mix of preventive and reactive measures (most commonly:
employee training and assistance programs), and not the
preventive-organisational measures advocated by authorities.
Finally, Walters et al. (2011) provided an overview of regulatory
strategies in five industrialised countries. They found little evi-
dence showing effectiveness of OHS management systems and
promotional strategies aiming at improving these systems.
3.2.3.5. Outcomes by mechanisms and intervention measures. No
obvious relationship emerged from the cross-tabulation of mecha-
OUTCOMES
Positive (step 3: 
improvements 
in working 
environment 
efforts) 
MEASURES
Overall 
inspection 
activities 
MECHANISMS
Dialogue 
Time 
strategies 
Other  
CONTEXT: 
WORKPLACE’S 
CHARACTERISTICS
CONTEXT: POLICIES, STANDARDS AND REGULATION
n/a 
SOCIOECONOMIC 
CONTEXT
Social partnership
Participation 
Agreements  
Legislation
General OHS legislation 
Existence of partial 
provisions on PSRs 
Intervention scope
Different 
understandings 
Risk factors 
Intervention strategies
Existence of initiatives 
Differences in strategies 
Other 
Inspectors’ 
competences
Training 
Intervention practices
Shortcomings of interventions 
Methods, tools 
Hansen et al. (2015)
OUTCOMES
Poor or no 
effects 
MEASURES
Policies on 
PSRs and 
OHS 
management 
MECHANISMS
Enlighten-
ment 
Marginal 
deterrence 
CONTEXT: 
WORKPLACE’S 
CHARACTERISTICS
CONTEXT: POLICIES, STANDARDS AND REGULATION
Barriers
Need of a never-
ending investment 
SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT
Social partnership
No strategy to increase 
participation 
Labour market and economics
Erosion of economic and social 
drivers of OHS regulation  
Growth of precarious 
employment with serious adverse 
OHS outcomes 
Neoliberalism
Light-touch, business-friendly 
approach 
Intervention scope
Process regulation 
Intervention strategies
No clear strategy 
Intervention practices
Shortcomings of 
interventions 
Differences in approaches 
Resources, support and 
statute of inspectorates
Insufficient or decreasing 
resources 
Walters et al. (2011)
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
Fig. 4. Comparison of two CMO configurations extracted out of Hansen et al. (2015) and Walters et al. (2011). PSRs = psychosocial risks.
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the 5 categories of intervention measures, it appears that public
policies on psychosocial risks mostly present poor results (6/10),
with no publication showing clear positive outcomes. Inspection
visits and overall inspection activities display a more balanced
account, with 3 publications suggesting negative outcomes, 2
mixed results, 1 possibly positive impacts and 3 positive outcomes.
Finally, the publication about alternative strategies exhibited pos-
itive outcomes.
3.2.4. Patterns of CMO configurations
In order to assess which dimensions could enable or impede
inspectors’ action, and to ease the interpretation of the results
despite their large heterogeneity, we chose to focus on two partic-
ularly exemplary CMO configurations, one with positive (Hansen
et al., 2015) and the other negative (Walters et al., 2011) outcomes.
Both were extracted out of international reviews on labour inspec-
tion. Fig. 4 schematically juxtaposes the two CMO configurations.
Hansen et al. (2015) reported on encouraging evaluation studies
from Denmark and Norway. Inspection activities are based on dia-
logue, group interviews and a combination of repeated visits with
other communication channels. There is a high degree of worker
participation. Workplaces must have health and safety representa-
tives and the social partners may conclude agreements on the
work environment. According to the general duty provisions,
employers must assess psychosocial risks, develop an action plan
and call in experts if they lack knowledge. Specific provisions on
the psychosocial work environment and on bullying complement
the regulatory framework. On the other hand, there is no legal def-inition of the psychosocial work environment, nor specific regula-
tion on some key risk factors (such as workload, time pressure or
emotional demands). Psychosocial topics are priority areas in every
country investigated. Intervention strategies are based on a risk-
factor approach. Every country has practices on violence and
threatening behaviour, bullying and sexual harassment, and lack
of training. Risk factors related to the organisation of work or rela-
tional matters are often included in the inspection of other factors
or in an overall assessment. Authorities may issue improvement
notices on these issues. Some other dimensions, such as working
hours and schedules, are not inspected in several countries. Inspec-
tion purposes and methods vary across countries, but in any case,
industries with high risks, such as social and healthcare, education
or public administration, are inspected as a priority. Most countries
offer basic training, including psychosocial issues, for new inspec-
tors, on-the-job training and continuing training activities. Spe-
cialised inspectors support their less experienced colleagues;
they are sometimes organised in skills networks. Authorities
develop tools and methods such as guidelines, checklists, struc-
tured interviews with employees and survey questionnaires.
Despite all these initiatives, only 1–16% of improvement notices
specifically address the psychosocial work environment.
By contrast, Walters et al. (2011) provide a critical assessment
of OHS policies in Australia, France, Canada (Québec), Sweden
and the UK. Policy-mixes encompass inspection visits, promotion
of OHS management systems (including psychosocial risks) and
alternative methods for companies that are difficult to reach with
conventional workplace visits. Enlightenment is a core principle
and the threat of sanctions is marginal. Case studies demonstrate
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to health and safety. However, there is little evidence for the effec-
tiveness of the other policy instruments, such as promotional
strategies and initiatives toward hard-to-reach companies. Besides,
the mainstream ‘‘management system” approach of OHS has not
been proven clearly effective. Actually, growing precariousness,
increasingly contingent work arrangements and a neo-liberal cli-
mate have eroded the economic and social drivers of OHS regula-
tion. In the five countries, there has been a regulatory shift
toward ‘‘process regulation”. However, authorities have not devel-
oped clear strategies and sufficient resources to achieve the goal, to
increase worker participation and to deal with the consequences of
the changing world of work. The new self-regulation approach has
not led to sustained changes in inspection practices, even if inspec-
tors are conscious of its value. There is an increased focus on pro-
cedural issues rather than on substance.
3.2.5. Recommendations from the literature
Most authors made recommendations for a better regulation of
psychosocial risks. The largest category concerned inspection
strategies (11 papers). Psychosocial risks should not be dealt with
as normal technical regulations through traditional inspection
methods (Bruhn and Frick, 2011; SLIC, 2012). Formal control of
documents and procedures should not have first priority (Bruhn,
2006). The adoption of a ‘‘resource perspective” could be more con-
vincing than the usual ‘‘problem perspective” (Leka et al., 2015b).
Inspectorates should raise awareness, educate, challenge and
advise companies and promote partnership beyond formal consul-
tation (SLIC, 2012). Inspectors could contribute to change pro-
cesses and influence the dynamics inside the workplace to reach
long-term improvements, if they could invest enough time (Leka
et al., 2015b; Saksvik et al., 2007; Starheim and Bøgehus, 2014).
There is a need to get out of an individual and reactive approach
mainly limited to bullying, and develop a collective and preventive
approach (Lerouge, 2014). More qualitative measures of the out-
comes should be developed to supplement the quantitative criteria
(Frick, 2014). Finally, Walters et al. (2011) suggested examining
the potential of supply chain initiatives and recalled the impor-
tance of face-to-face contact and fear of surveillance.
Actions at a legislative level were suggested in 6 publications.
Several authors recommended examining how far it would be pos-
sible to specify legal requirements on psychosocial risks. Such pro-
visions would enable enterprises to know their duties better, and
inspectors to act more effectively (Bruhn and Frick, 2011; Hansen
et al., 2015; Lippel et al., 2011; Toukas et al., 2015). Johnstone
et al. (2011) and Quinlan (2007) contend that an explicit reference
to psychosocial risks, restructuring and contingent work should be
incorporated into general duty provisions; codes on downsizing/
restructuring and workload should be developed.
An evolution of the inspectors’ role and competences was
deemed necessary in 5 papers. Inspectors need autonomy to adjust
to individual situations. Further developments of inspectors as a
professional group are required, which necessitates a strong inter-
nal dialogue. More training in assessing and preventing psychoso-
cial risks, and in conducting interviews, would help inspectors
(Bruhn, 2006; Bruhn and Frick, 2011; Jespersen et al., 2014;
Rasmussen et al., 2011; Toukas et al., 2015). Likewise, 3 publica-
tions recommended further developing inspection tools, methods,
guidance and protocols (Mellor et al., 2011; Quinlan, 2007;
Rasmussen et al., 2011). Finally, some publications suggested
actions in the field of industrial relations and labour market.
Johnstone et al. (2011) state that psychosocial risks should be
recognised in industrial relations issues. Hasle and Petersen
(2004) hold the view that agreements between social partners
must not exclude the authorities: a cooperation between the part-
ners and the state is necessary to put pressure on reticent firmsand to control companies that are not organised at a branch-
level. Lastly, Frick (2014) called for a slowed-down deregulation
of the labour market and for the prevention of social dumping, in
order to counter the growing gap between the best and the worst
employers.4. Discussion
4.1. Refined programme theory
Realist reviews start and end with theory. We began with a
rough programme theory and refined it in the course of the review.
A core feature of the refined programme theory (Fig. 3, Section 3.2)
is the importance of national contexts, addressed in all papers but
one. This is coherent with Cheng’s (2015) conclusion on the neces-
sity of a comprehensive understanding of the local context to
develop effective actions against work-related stress. The compar-
ison of the 30 CMO configurations revealed the difficulty in extrap-
olating the results from studies to different settings. Because of this
large variety, we chose to apply the refined programme theory to
two synthetic reports (Hansen et al., 2015; Walters et al., 2011)
to provide a pattern of CMO configurations. It allowed us to high-
light the characteristics of the Nordic way of inspecting the psy-
chosocial work environment, to explain its rather positive
outcomes, and to compare them to the more disappointing results
observed in other advanced market economies. The still highly
organised labour market in Nordic countries has a determining
influence on inspectors’ interventions. Hasle and Petersen (2004)
note the difficulty of using agreements between social partners
as a public policy instrument in lower structured labour markets.
Nevertheless, the Nordic countries should not be schematically
contrasted with other political regimes. Frick (2014) indeed draws
nuanced conclusions on the implementation of the systematic
work environment management in Sweden. Hasle and Petersen
(2004) also suggest that agreements could entail some risks for
authorities, especially the risk of excluding inspectors’ interven-
tions. Beyond the Nordic model, support by social partners and
participation within companies are important success conditions
for government interventions. However, several authors note that
evolutions of the global economy undermine an efficient collabora-
tion with the social partners. Changed work arrangements may
have negative consequences on workers’ health, with an increase
in psychosocial risks and more obstacles to the management of
occupational health and safety (Quinlan, 2007; Quinlan et al.,
2009; Toukas et al., 2015; Walters et al., 2011).
Tompa et al. (2007) suggests that labour inspectors have to be in
the field for regulation to be effective. Yet, many publications report
on the limited resources of inspectorates to make direct and
repeated contact with companies. According to Weil (2008),
resource limitations are the major problem facing labour inspec-
torates worldwide. Investigation of psychosocial and organisational
risks require more time than the traditional safety hazards. Work-
places have become more difficult to reach; this has further
increased the time pressure on inspectors. In the wake of New Public
Management, management indicators and incentive systems are
meant to measure and improve the performance of labour inspec-
torates (Frick, 2014; Quinlan, 2007). This trend may incite agencies
and inspectors to increase the numbers of visits, reduce their dura-
tion and lead to a focus on easy-to-assess topics (Frick, 2014).
We initially hoped to find information on workplace character-
istics that might facilitate inspectors’ interventions, such as the
industry or demographic structure. However, very few publica-
tions provide such data and authors more often highlight the
impediments. Only company size is regularly cited as an important
factor; large companies are more able to manage these issues.
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the publications.
Regarding the intervention measures, we found several detailed
accounts on the inspection of the psychosocial work environment
in Nordic countries, continental Europe, the UK, Australia and
Canada (Québec). In most countries, inspectors indirectly address
psychosocial risks through the assessment of the OHSmanagement
systems inside workplaces. They check if companies have pro-
cesses to ensure the detection and prevention of the whole range
of occupational hazards, including psychosocial issues. Over recent
decades, this approach has been the main strategy to encourage
employers to fulfil their general prevention duties (Walters et al.,
2011). In some Nordic countries, inspectors conduct specific psy-
chosocial inspections. However, routine inspections of the psy-
chosocial work environment are an exception outside Denmark
(Rasmussen et al., 2011).
The publications highlight several kinds of government inter-
ventions: workplace visits, development of instruments, promo-
tion of social dialogue, regulatory and voluntary approaches on
systematic OHS management, etc. A majority of references do not
strictly focus on inspection visits: inspectors’ activities are
included in a wide array of interrelated measures. This is important
to keep in mind when trying to assess the efficiency of inspection
visits. It seems difficult to isolate their outcomes, independently of
other public policy measures.
According to the realist logic, interventions do not directly
cause outcomes. They are mediated by mechanisms, which are a
function of the context (Wong et al., 2013b). Enlightenment, advice
and dialogue are by far the most frequent strategies used by
inspectorates to address psychosocial risks and foster compliance.
No author mentioned deterrence as a common approach. This is
not surprising. Psychosocial risks are complex and relatively new
for labour inspectors. In many countries, specific legal provisions
on this topic do not exist; moreover, the boundary between pre-
vention of psychosocial risks and managerial prerogatives is fuzzy.
Nevertheless, some authors consider deterrence as a necessary
ingredient for an efficient intervention by labour inspectors.
Inspection styles seem to some degree culturally and socially con-
ditioned: Bruhn (2009) stresses the differences between male
‘‘technicians” with a command-and-control inspection style, and
newly hired ‘‘academics” addressing soft factors and preferring
deep investigations. Bruhn (2006) also notes that an inspector
deploys several styles depending on the workplace’s reactions.
Indeed, most publications report on an array of interconnected
mechanisms, rather than on isolated ones. This is probably a rea-
son why this review did not find any regular relationship between
mechanisms and outcomes. Depending on the study, the same
mechanisms lead to positive or negative results, and positive
impacts are associated with various mechanisms.
A striking feature is the very small quantitative evidence on the
effectiveness of psychosocial inspections. Few publications
reported on quantitative results and even fewer were primary
research articles. Furthermore, only 5 publications specifically
aimed at evaluating the outcomes of interventions. In comparison,
the Cochrane review on enforcement tools for preventing occupa-
tional diseases and injuries (Mischke et al., 2013) identified 23
studies, of which 16 were quantitative; several were randomised
controlled trials, controlled intervention studies or interrupted
time-series. As mentioned by Starheim and Bøgehus (2014),
research on the inspection of psychosocial issues has only just
begun. The available data delivers a rather mixed picture. Peer-
reviewed articles are overrepresented in publications reporting
no positive outcomes, mixed results or possibly positive results.
Publications reporting positive results mostly belong to the grey
literature. Several papers on workplace visits showed a positive
impact; but, by contrast, most publications on public policies werecharacterised by the absence of positive outcomes. This result con-
firms the existence of a gap between policy and practice
(Langenhan et al., 2013; Leka et al., 2011b; Zoni and Lucchini,
2012). Inspectors may be rather successful at a micro-level, con-
vincing employers during their inspection duties, while policies
at a macro-level do not seem to fulfil expectations. A possible
explanation would be that inspectors are only able to inspect a
fraction of workplaces, and maybe not the worst ones.
Evaluating the outcomes of state interventions on psychosocial
risks is a challenge. Safety improvements can be measured through
standard indicators such as injury rates. Equivalent easy-to-access
information does not exist for the psychosocial work environment;
specific assessment tools are needed to gather data. Moreover, the
outcomes of an intervention can be multiple: better informed
stakeholders, changes in attitudes, stronger prevention efforts,
safer work processes, reduced exposures, lower rates of work-
related diseases, improved health, etc. An impact ladder such as
suggested by Hansen et al. (2015) helps specify the criteria and
enables a comparison between studies. Finally, several publica-
tions insist on the importance of long time-spans and repeated vis-
its for effective inspection. Outcomes may be difficult to assess
within the tight schedules of applied research and public policy
evaluation.
4.2. Strengths and limitations of the review
Strengths of this review include the use of a realist approach to
relate outcomes to their contexts and generative mechanisms. This
approach is consistent with the nature of the existing publications,
which describe contexts in detail, provide information on mecha-
nisms, but rarely assess results. Another interest is the develop-
ment of an enriched programme theory encompassing a wide
array of influences on inspector intervention.
The main limitation to the generalisability of our findings is the
lack of evaluation studies. A few quantitative studies from Nordic
countries show positive results. It is not clear to what extent they
can be extrapolated to other national contexts. Lindblom and
Hansson (2004) warn about the difficulty of international compar-
isons: many factors interact in complex ways with agency activi-
ties and resources. According to the SLIC report (2012), not every
method is suitable in a given country. The Nordic corporatist tradi-
tion and highly structured labour market probably facilitate the
use of collective interviews and questionnaire inquiries. These
tools might be less functional in more liberal regimes. Anyway,
without evaluation studies outside Northern Europe, comparisons
are currently not possible. In addition, it would be useful for regu-
latory agencies to know in which industries and types of work-
places they could have the largest impact. To answer these
questions, there is a need for quantitative and mixed-method
research, in order to assess outcomes, and link them with their
contexts and mechanisms. The SECO is currently conducting a lon-
gitudinal evaluation study for this purpose.
Our resources allowed us to involve only one researcher in the
literature search, data extraction and information coding. This is
another limitation of our review. According to Mouter and Vonk
Noordegraaf (2012), performing an intercoder reliability check in
qualitative research is very time consuming. It is also more difficult
when the reviewed literature does not discuss exactly the same
topic as the one under study. In our case, the included publications
turned out to be very heterogeneous; indeed, the coding scheme
included more than 70 hierarchically ordered categories. More-
over, Marchal et al. (2012) stress that theory-driven evaluation
can be resource- and time-intensive, because it assesses not only
efficacy, but also the underlying theory. This might be a reason
why intercoder reliability is not mentioned in the publication stan-
dards for realist syntheses (Wong et al., 2013a).
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transparent extraction and coding process, so that the data might
be reanalysed. Both authors contributed to the definition of the
search process, the selection of databases and the choice of inclu-
sion and exclusion criteria. Data extraction and coding proved con-
sistent and reliable based on the check by the second author. Our
results were also validated by key stakeholders during a meeting
with a panel of about 20 OHS specialists within the SECO (federal
labour inspectors, lawyers, work psychologists, ergonomists and
other experts). At last, the whole review process was regularly dis-
cussed and improved in collaboration with other researchers
within the SECO.
Certain questions remain unresolved. First, there is a debate on
the relevance of specific provisions for the prevention of psychoso-
cial risks. Some authors consider it unnecessary to legislate on
these issues, because they are covered by employers’ general
duties (Lerouge, 2014; Velásquez, 2012). However, more authors
defend the view that specific references, at least in the general duty
provisions, would facilitate the work of labour inspectors and the
implementation of preventive measures (Bruhn and Frick, 2011;
Hansen et al., 2015; Johnstone et al., 2011; Lippel and Quinlan,
2011; Lippel et al., 2011; Quinlan, 2007; Toukas et al., 2015). A sec-
ond open question concerns the limits of inspectors’ intervention:
how much should they contribute to the assessment of the psy-
chosocial risks? In some Nordic countries, inspectors conduct
specific psychosocial risk assessments. However, in most countries,
they rather evaluate the capacity of employers to assess and man-
age risks on their own. Starheim and Bøgehus (2014) suggested
that inspectors should even contribute to the organisational pre-
vention process: who should support the workplaces to solve their
problems, if inspectors were to concentrate only on the assessment
part? Considering inspectorates’ limited resources, we would
rather suggest a cooperation between authorities, social partners
and occupational health consultants or services. For example,
employer associations could support their members – especially
small and medium enterprises – by offering them the possibility
to call in experts recommended or employed by the association.
5. Conclusions
To our knowledge, this systematic review is the first to deal
with the inspection of the psychosocial work environment. We
chose a realist approach to address this topic. The literature search
identified publications from Europe, Australia and Canada. Authors
primarily describe national or international settings that shape
inspector interventions; some papers report on quantitative
results. Overall, the picture is mixed. Inspectors prove quite suc-
cessful at convincing employers during visits, while prevention
policies at a more macro-level seem to fall short of their objectives.
We propose a theoretical model of the influences on labour
inspector effectiveness in this field. It could be used for evaluation
studies in order to explain and more easily compare their results.
However, this implies that quantitative or mixed-method studies
are conducted in the future. Such studies certainly present chal-
lenges. The loose definition of psychosocial risks is a substantial
issue; different studies address this topic through different theo-
retical lenses and definitions. Some evaluate the impact of inspec-
tion on specific risk factors, while others address the psychosocial
work environment as a whole. Moreover, long-term inspection
effects should certainly be assessed. Finally, the prospect of an
evaluation may worry labour inspectors, especially with such a rel-
atively touchy issue.
Nevertheless, Lindblom and Hansson (2004) contend that
labour inspectors have good opportunities to systematically assess
the effectiveness of their action and to compare different interven-
tion methods. To this end, they recommend developing stringentevaluation processes, which would isolate the effect of inspection
from other factors; evaluation could be integrated in the general
planning of inspection activities. We think that realist evaluation
is an adequate approach to tackle these challenges. Indeed, it does
not aim at determining whether inspection has an effect on the
psychosocial work environment – which may be disappointing –
but where, in which situations, and how. Identifying such success
factors would allow inspectorates to make informed decisions
about the focus of their actions.Acknowledgements
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